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THE LAW OF ABANDONMENT  
AND THE PASSING OF PROPERTY IN TRASH 
This article examines the law of abandonment – primarily in 
the context of rubbish disposal – from a comparative 
perspective. It will, in particular, consider whether the owner 
of moveable property can, in theory, divest himself of 
ownership rights therein by simply abandoning the chattel in 
question, and whether the common law recognises such a 
concept of (unilateral) divesting abandonment. Additionally, 
the article will examine how, if at all, the notion of 
abandonment – as it is understood and applied in relation to 
physical property – may also operate in the realm of 
intangible property. 
SAW Cheng Lim* 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Cambridge); 
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 It is trite that outdoor trash bins (or dumpsters) can often be an 
unintended and valuable source of information. People dispose of waste 
for a host of reasons, ranging from the mundane to the highly sensitive 
and covert. This probably explains the impetus behind the commonly-
encountered practice known as “dumpster diving” – to rummage 
through other people’s trash in the hope of finding skeletons in the 
closet or other forms of private and confidential information. The 
motives of the dumpster diver are not always oblique. Apart from those 
who surreptitiously obtain sensitive information (such as passwords, 
credit card numbers, bank account details and trade secrets) for 
purposes of committing identity theft or industrial espionage, there are 
others who dumpster dive (or who engage the services of private 
investigators to do so on their behalf) as a result of the need for discreet 
and undetected retrieval of documents/evidence for civil and criminal 
trials. Such was the case with the defendant in a fairly recent dispute 
before the Singapore High Court. 
                                                                       
* The author owes a debt of gratitude to Professors Michael Furmston and George 
Wei for having inspired the writing of this article and is also grateful to SMU’s 
Office of Research for funding this research project. 
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2 In Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa,1 the defendant had 
obtained a judgment in New York against a third party, whilst the 
plaintiff was in possession of certain documents which revealed that the 
third party (a company allegedly related to the plaintiff) had assets in 
Singapore. Obviously, these highly relevant documents would come in 
useful if the defendant tried to enforce the New York judgment in 
Singapore against the third party. As fate would have it, the plaintiff later 
disposed of these allegedly confidential documents as waste, which was 
routinely picked up by contract cleaners and subsequently left at a 
common rubbish dump for collection and disposal. The defendant then 
managed, with the help of private investigators, to retrieve these 
discarded documents (prior to the arrival of the trash collector) and 
later tendered them as evidence in separate court proceedings against 
the third party. 
3 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against 
the defendant in the form of an application for summary judgment and 
argued that the defendant’s unauthorised retention and use of the 
plaintiff ’s documents amounted to a conversion of the plaintiff ’s 
property as well as an equitable breach of confidence.2 In relation to the 
plaintiff ’s argument on conversion,3 the defendant claimed to be 
entitled to ownership and possession of those discarded documents on 
the basis that the plaintiff, in putting them out as rubbish for collection, 
had abandoned all rights of ownership in them. This line of reasoning 
was, however, rejected by Andrew Ang J, who granted the plaintiff ’s 
application accordingly. On appeal, V K Rajah JA, on behalf of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal, overturned Ang J’s decision,4 principally 
because this particular case involved novel issues of law (eg, the doctrine 
of abandonment) and required a full examination of all the relevant 
facts.5 As such, his Honour decided, “without adjudicating conclusively 
on the merits of each side’s case, that the matter should proceed to trial 
instead of being summarily determined”.6 
4 The aim of this article, therefore, is to examine the issue of 
abandonment in the specific context of rubbish disposal – a rather 
                                                                       
1 [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573. 
2 A discussion of the issues arising from the plaintiff’s allegations of breach of 
confidence is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article. 
3 The plaintiff has locus standi to sue for conversion only if he can establish a 
wrongful interference with his ownership rights in (or rights to immediate 
possession of) personal property – see Marfani & Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd 
[1968] 1 WLR 956 at 970–971; The Cherry [2003] 1 SLR(R) 471 at [58]–[59]. The 
action in conversion, which is a strict liability tort for the protection of ownership, 
essentially gives effect to the sanctity of property rights. 
4 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540. 
5 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540 at [40]. 
6 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540 at [40]. 
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“mundane matter” which is nevertheless a “necessary and common 
occurrence in daily life”.7 Can it be argued, for example, that a 
homeowner who puts rubbish out for collection by the curbside has, by 
this act alone, clearly evinced an intention to completely relinquish his 
ownership rights therein? Can the homeowner, after discovering that he 
had disposed of certain documents in error or inadvertently (and before 
the arrival of the trash collector), subsequently change his mind and 
recover those documents from the trash bin? In exploring these 
questions from a multi-jurisdictional perspective, this article will also 
consider whether it is possible, in theory, for the owner of moveable 
property to divest himself of his ownership rights by merely abandoning 
the chattel in question, and whether the common law recognises such a 
concept of (unilateral) “divesting abandonment”. Additionally, the 
article will examine how, if at all, the notion of abandonment – as it is 
understood and applied in relation to physical property (such as trash) – 
may also operate in the realm of intangible property. For example, how 
do the laws of copyright and trade marks determine the circumstances 
under which the intellectual property owner is deemed to have 
unconditionally abandoned the ownership of his intellectual property? 
II. “Abandonment” defined 
5 The word “abandonment” may, in law, assume a number of 
different meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. It is 
important, at the outset, to distinguish between an abandonment of 
ownership of property (or title to property) and an abandonment of 
possession of (or control over) property.8 It has been said that the mere 
relinquishment of “possession” of a thing is not an abandonment in a 
legal sense, since such an act is not wholly inconsistent with the idea of 
continuing “ownership”. The act of abandonment must be an overt act 
(or some failure to act) which carries the implication that the legal 
owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the subject matter of the 
abandonment.9 This is sometimes known as “divesting abandonment” – 
an abandonment of both possession and ownership,10 whereupon the 
property in question is deemed to be returned to the common pool of 
unowned resources. 
                                                                       
7 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540 at [42]. 
8 “Property”, in this article and unless otherwise advised, refers to movable or 
personal property. 
9 See Riverside Drainage Dist. of Sedgwick County v Hunt 33 Kan App 2d 225;  
99 P 3d 1135 (2004). 
10 See State v Pidcock 89 Or App 443 at 448 (1988): “Abandonment is the voluntary 
relinquishment of the possession of an object by the owner with the [coterminous] 
intention of terminating his or her ownership” in that object. 
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6 From a brief survey of US and Canadian case law, it is apparent 
that two requirements must be satisfied in order to effect a proper 
abandonment of property. According to the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Simpson v Gowers,11 “[a]bandonment occurs when there is ‘a giving up, 
a total desertion, and absolute relinquishment’ of private goods by  
the former owner. It may arise when the owner with the specific intent 
of desertion and relinquishment casts away or leaves behind his 
property …”. There must therefore be, in addition to the overt act of 
abandonment itself, a specific intention/motive on the part of the 
original owner to completely relinquish all rights of ownership – 
voluntarily and, more importantly, without regard as to who may 
subsequently take possession of the property. It bears repeating that 
such relinquishment must be to the extent where the former owner is 
completely indifferent as to the fate of the discarded object (ie, as to 
what/who may await the abandoned property).12 In other words, if 
anyone else takes and uses the abandoned property in whatever manner, 
that is a matter of no consequence to him.13 
7 Proof of “intention” is, of course, a question of fact. Clearly, an 
intention to abandon property will not ordinarily be presumed.14 There 
must, generally, be some direct or affirmative evidence of subjective 
intent.15 Alternatively, intention may be established objectively, through 
the process of inference, from the overt acts and conduct of the 
proprietor – eg, from the circumstances surrounding the proprietor’s 
treatment of the property, the manner and location of abandonment, as 
well as the nature and value of the property. There must, in other words, 
be some explicit conduct which can be taken to indicate, clearly and 
objectively, that the owner no longer wants his or her property. 
                                                                       
11 (1981) 121 DLR (3d) 709 at 711. This was the definition given in R A Brown, The 
Law of Personal Property (Chicago: Callaghan, 2nd Ed, 1955) at p 9, which the 
court endorsed. Ipp J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia also cited this 
definition with approval in Keene v Carter (1994) 12 WAR 20 at 26. 
12 See Schaffner v Benson 166 NE 881 at 883 (1929); Martin v Cassidy 307 P 2d 981  
at 984 (1957). See also Railroad Commission of Texas v Waste Management of Texas, 
Inc 880 SW 2d 835 at 843 (1994): “When applied to personal property, we think 
the term [‘abandon’] also includes an intent by the owner to leave the property free 
to be appropriated by any other person.” 
13 This, it is submitted, is what distinguishes an “abandonment” from an outright 
“gift” of property, a point to which we will return below. See, further, J E Penner, 
The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) at pp 88–90. See also 
Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 35 (Butterworths LexisNexis, 4th Ed Reissue, 1994) 
at para 1225: “Abandonment of goods takes place when possession of them is 
quitted voluntarily without any intention of transferring them to another.” 
14 Indeed, the presumption must be that the owner of property intends to preserve 
his rights in the property. 
15 See Foulke v New York Consol R Co 228 NY 269 at 273 (1920); Linscomb v Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co 199 F 2d 431 at 435 (1952) (“clear, unequivocal and decisive” 
evidence). 
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8 To what extent, then, does the act of rubbish disposal (whether 
in trash bags left by the curbside or in the common rubbish dump of a 
building awaiting collection) indicate a clear and specific intention on 
the part of the owner to abandon not just possession of the property, 
but also ownership thereof? Does “divesting abandonment” ever arise 
when rubbish is disposed of in this manner? We shall now examine how 
these questions have been addressed by the courts in different 
jurisdictions. 
III. A general survey of case law developments 
9 It may be usefully noted, at the outset, that the law of 
abandonment is as yet untested in Singapore. As V K Rajah JA has 
observed,16 “[t]here is no legislation, case law or authoritative academic 
view on title to or possession of items which have been disposed of as 
rubbish”. Case law developments elsewhere have also been far from 
uniform. V K Rajah JA has, in this regard, noted thus:17 
The positions vary across different jurisdictions, with the courts in 
Australia, Canada and the US generally recognising, but applying 
differently, the concept of ‘divesting abandonment’ – ie, the 
abandonment of both ownership as well as possession. 
10 Be that as it may, it is hoped that the following review of case 
law and subsequent analysis of the relevant principles will at least offer 
some guidance to the courts in Singapore on the applicability of the law 
of abandonment in the specific context of rubbish disposal. 
A. The US and Canada 
11 The doctrine of abandonment has been employed in the US in 
two different contexts. In the property law context (involving a civil 
claim for conversion of personal property and with which this article is 
primarily concerned), “abandonment” refers to an owner’s voluntary 
and intentional relinquishment of a proprietary interest in property to 
the extent that another person may take possession of that property and 
assert a superior interest to it.18 On the other hand, “abandonment” in 
the context of search and seizure (or in the constitutional, Fourth 
Amendment context)19 is concerned with whether the defendant, in 
                                                                       
16 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540 at [41]. See also Lai 
Siu Chiu J in The Best Source Restaurant Pte Ltd v Wan Chai Capital Holdings Pte 
Ltd [2009] SGHC 266 at [40]. 
17 Obegi Melissa v Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 540 at [41]. 
18 See, eg, United States v Shelby 573 F 2d 971 at 973 (1978). 
19 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America provides 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated …”. 
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discarding property, has relinquished his “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” with respect to the property, so that its search and seizure 
(usually by the police and without a warrant) is deemed reasonable 
within the limits of the Fourth Amendment.20 
12 Insofar as rubbish disposal is concerned, US cases have 
consistently held, in the property law context, that property in trash – 
whether it be documents or other discarded material – is considered 
abandoned whenever it is placed in trash bags which are then placed in 
unlocked dumpsters by the curbside (being readily accessible to others). 
This was the position taken by California’s Court of Appeal for the 
Third District in Ananda Church of Self-Realization v Massachusetts Bay 
Ins Co,21 where Callahan J expressed the following view:22 
Documents which have been placed in an outdoor trash barrel no 
longer retain their character as the personal property of the one who 
has discarded [them]. By placing them into the garbage, the owner 
renounces the key incidents of ownership – title, possession, and the 
right to control. 
13 In another case, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana (First Circuit) 
cited, as an example of res derelictae,23 items which are “to be removed by 
garbage collectors”.24 Accordingly, under US law, the removal of 
documents from an outdoor trash bin (including other forms of 
dumpster diving) does not amount to a conversion of property. It 
appears that the courts in Canada, when faced with these facts, are likely 
to adopt a similar view of the law of abandonment.25 
14 Is this, however, a sound and defensible proposition – that 
personal property which has been discarded as waste, in a place that is 
accessible to the public, ought to be considered abandoned by the 
former owner? Can it be consistently maintained that a homeowner, 
who leaves bags of rubbish in bins outside his home for the specific 
purpose of garbage collection and disposal, necessarily intends to 
abandon the rubbish res derelictae? These are questions to which we will 
                                                                       
20 See, eg, City of St Paul v Vaughn 306 Minn 337 (1975). 
21 95 Cal App 4th 1273 (2002). 
22 Ananda Church of Self-Realization v Massachusetts Bay Ins Co 95 Cal App 4th 1273 
at 1282 (2002). See also Long v Dilling Mechanical Contractors, Inc 705 NE 2d 1022 
at 1025 (1999): “[T]here is a widely held and long-standing doctrine that 
personalty discarded as waste is considered abandoned.” See, further, Indiana 
Waste Systems of Indiana, Inc v Indiana Department of State Revenue 633 NE 2d 359 
at 367 (1994); Meyer Waste Systems, Inc v Indiana Department of State Revenue  
741 NE 2d 1 at 6 (2000). But, cf, Sharpe v Turley 191 SW 3d 362 at 367–368 (2006). 
23 As to the meaning of res derelictae, see para 22 of this article. 
24 See Charrier v Bell 496 So 2d 601 at 605 (1986). 
25 See Canada (Attorney-General) v Brock (1991) 59 BCLR (2d) 261; Stewart v 
Gustafson [1999] 4 WWR 695. 
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return later. It may well be argued that although the homeowner did 
relinquish “possession” of the trash by placing it in outdoor bins, it was 
never his intention to relinquish “ownership” of it to the first person 
who comes along and appropriates it. 
15 There is, as mentioned above, another context in which the 
doctrine of abandonment is relevant in the US (and, indeed, Canada). 
This relates to the constitutional or Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. A discussion of this subject 
is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, for 
present purposes, that US federal law in this regard is no different. Just 
as a homeowner is deemed to have abandoned his ownership rights in 
trash that is left outside his home for collection, he too is deemed to 
have abandoned his “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the said 
trash, and therefore has no grounds of complaint against the police for 
searching through his trash bags without a warrant.26 But even if we 
were to accept – as correct – the proposition that a homeowner had 
indeed abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of 
such trash, does it necessarily follow that he must have also abandoned 
his ownership rights therein and, accordingly, his right of action against 
a third party dumpster diver in conversion? The present author thinks 
not, for reasons which will be furnished below. 
B. Australia and New Zealand 
16 The courts in Australia did not initially recognise the concept of 
divesting abandonment. In the early decision of the Tasmanian Supreme 
Court in Johnstone & Wilmot Pty Ltd v Kaine,27 Inglis Clark J, having 
engaged in a detailed analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, concluded 
thus:28 
On the whole I think I should adopt the rule that the intentional 
abandonment of a chattel by the owner of it does not divest him of his 
ownership, and that if another person finds the chattel not knowing 
                                                                       
26 See, in particular, the US Supreme Court decision in California v Greenwood  
486 US 35 (1988). Note, however, the powerful dissent by Brennan J, with whom 
Marshall J concurred. For a critique of the Greenwood decision and its implications 
for trash bag searches conducted (not by police officers but) by civilian dumpster 
divers (who search, inter alia, for valuable trade secrets and confidential 
information), see H Wingo, “Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade 
Secret Law” (1997) 16 Yale Law and Policy Review 195. It ought to be noted that 
the law in Canada in this regard tracks very closely to that in the US – see s 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the decision of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Krist (1995) 42 CR (4th) 159. See, further, R v 
Tessling (2004) 244 DLR (4th) 541; R v Patrick (2005) ABPC 242. 
27 (1928) 23 Tas LR 43. 
28 (1928) 23 Tas LR 43 at 58. 
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who the owner of it is, he is in the same position as the finder of a lost 
chattel who does not know who the owner of it is. [emphasis added] 
17 The issue as to whether chattels could be abandoned in law was 
also left open by Samuels JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
decision in Moorhouse v Angus & Robertson (No 1) Pty Ltd,29 as well as by 
Angel J in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Cook v 
Saroukos.30 Although Angel J was prepared to accept Inglis Clark J’s 
reasoning in Johnstone & Wilmot Pty Ltd v Kaine,31 his Honour 
nevertheless expressed the view that there was “no reason in principle” 
why title to a chattel could not be extinguished by an act of 
abandonment.32 
18 Indeed, more recent authorities have confirmed that it is 
entirely possible, at common law, to abandon one’s property and divest 
oneself of ownership, although cases of such nature will “be relatively 
rare”.33 Whether or not abandonment is established in any given case will 
invariably turn on the intention of the original owner, which has to be 
clear and unequivocal.34 
19 In relation to the specific question of rubbish disposal, it is 
instructive to consider Higgins J’s remarks in Leonard George Munday v 
Australian Capital Territory,35 where his Honour opined thus:36 
A person ‘scavenging’ at a public rubbish dump may assume that those 
discarding goods do not intend in future to assert their title to those 
goods. If the ‘scavenger’ then takes possession of those goods, he or she 
obtains good title against the rest of the world. 
20 Although Higgins J specifically referred to a “public rubbish 
dump”, it is plausible, in the context of urban and land-scarce Singapore, 
to extend the analogy to include all trash bins and receptacles provided 
                                                                       
29 [1981] 1 NSWLR 700 at 706. 
30 (1989) 97 FLR 33. 
31 (1928) 23 Tas LR 43. 
32 (1989) 97 FLR 33 at 41. 
33 Per Kiefel J in Re Jigrose Pty Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 382 at 386. His Honour also 
expressed the following view: “It seems to me that if I do not wish to retain the 
possession or property in goods (perhaps most clearly shown by throwing them 
away), there is no reason in principle why the common law would require me to 
remain owner. … For my part I do not consider that there is a difficulty at law with 
the notion of abandonment divesting ownership.” Re Jigrose Pty Ltd was 
subsequently endorsed by Ipp J in Keene v Carter (1994) 12 WAR 20. 
34 “The cases make it clear, in Australia at least, that an express intention to abandon 
coupled with an occupation by a newcomer is required before abandonment is 
complete.” (L Aitken, “The Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 
68 ALJ 263 at 272.) 
35 (1998) 146 FLR 17. 
36 (1998) 146 FLR 17 at [135]. 
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for the convenience and use of the general public to dispose of waste 
material in public places. Arguably, a scavenger who rummages through 
such a public facility can reasonably infer that all the trash found therein 
had indeed been abandoned by their former owners. Such an argument, 
however, cannot apply mutatis mutandis in cases where the rubbish in 
question has been deposited in bags by the curbside outside one’s home 
(a “private” dwelling) or at the common rubbish dump of a commercial 
building. It will be explained later that even though the curbside outside 
a private dwelling and the common rubbish dump of a commercial 
building are places to which the public can ordinarily gain access 
(because these premises are typically left unsecured), they are by no 
means the equivalent of places/facilities which are intended for 
common, public use. In this sense, these premises are not, objectively 
speaking, truly “public” in character and it is therefore impermissible to 
raise the inference that there is present a specific and unequivocal 
intention to abandon ownership rights in trash which has been left for 
collection at such premises. 
21 The question of abandonment has also been considered in New 
Zealand in the context of insolvency law, namely, the right of the Official 
Assignee to abandon property which has passed to him on the 
adjudication of a bankrupt. In Edmonds Judd v Official Assignee,37 
Richardson P in the New Zealand Court of Appeal agreed with the view 
advanced by Blackstone38 and held that abandonment, at common law, 
“is a recognised mode of losing title to property”.39 As always, the same 
yardstick is applied – there must be “conduct evincing the intention to 
abandon the right”.40 
C. Roman law 
22 Before turning to the common law position in England, it is 
apposite at this juncture to briefly examine the application of the 
doctrine of abandonment in Roman law. There were essentially two 
schools of thought. The first (and more widely accepted) was advanced 
by the Sabinians, who were of the view that property could be 
abandoned and could become ownerless from the moment the 
abandoner manifests his desire to abandon and physically abandons the 
property in question, whereupon the first person who subsequently 
acquires possession of the property becomes its new owner. The 
Sabinian notion of abandonment, as characterised by a clear intention 
                                                                       
37 [2000] 2 NZLR 135. As to abandonment in the context of “reasonable expectations 
of privacy”, see R v Reuben [1995] 3 NZLR 165. 
38 See W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Book 2) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1766) at p 9. 
39 [2000] 2 NZLR 135 at [23]. 
40 [2000] 2 NZLR 135 at [25]. 
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to divest absolutely and as supported in Roman law by the concepts  
res derelicta and occupatio (or derelictio cum occupatione),41 is also 
sometimes referred to as “unilateral divesting abandonment”.42 
23 The Proculians, on the other hand, advocated that ownership in 
property could not be relinquished just by the mere intent/desire to 
abandon, but only after a transfer or conveyance of the property43 to 
some other (usually unidentified) person who then becomes the new 
owner upon taking possession of it. The Proculian school of thought, as 
supported in Roman law by the maxim traditio incertae personae, is also 
sometimes referred to as “bilateral divesting abandonment”.44 
24 To illustrate these divergent views on abandonment, consider 
the following example. Somebody throws money into a crowd, the 
money being placed at the disposal of anyone who cares to take it. The 
Proculians would argue that property in the money was extinguished 
not when it was thrown but only after it was collected by a third party 
recipient, whereas the Sabinians would maintain that the abandoner had 
ceased to be owner the very moment the money was thrown from his 
hands. Notwithstanding these differences in opinion, one commentator 
has perceptively argued that it “seems to make little difference whether a 
unilateral or bilateral divesting abandonment model is adopted as the 
person who takes possession of the abandoned chattel acquires 
ownership at the moment that he takes possession”.45 This observation is 
particularly germane in the context of the present discussion, since an 
action for conversion can only be initiated against a third party 
dumpster diver who, without permission, has obtained actual 
possession (and hence ownership) of the plaintiff ’s property. What is 
apparent though is that whichever view one takes of divesting 
                                                                       
41 In Roman law, res derelicta (or res derelictae) refers to goods which have been 
voluntarily and intentionally abandoned by their owners, whilst ownership rights  
(or title to property) could be acquired by occupatio, which is taking actual possession 
or control of what never had an owner (res nullius) or has ceased to have one  
(res derelicta). See, further, Hawkins v Mahoney 990 P 2d 776 at 779 (1999). 
42 See J Griffiths-Baker, “Divesting Abandonment: An Unnecessary Concept?” (2007) 
36(1) Common Law World Review 16 at 18; R W League, Roman Law (London: 
Macmillan, 3rd Ed, 1961) at 177–178. 
43 Either gratuitously (as a “gift”) or for a fee (as in a “sale”). 
44 See J Griffiths-Baker, “Divesting Abandonment: An Unnecessary Concept?” (2007) 
36(1) Common Law World Review 16 at 18; D Daube, “Derelictio, Occupatio and 
Traditio: Romans and Rabbis” (1961) 77 LQR 382. See also Charles Viner,  
A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (2nd Ed) vol 22 at p 409 (“Waife”); 
C St Germain, Doctor and Student (T F T Plucknett & J L Barton eds) (London: 
Seldon Society, 1974) Book II, ch 51 at pp 290–292. See, further, L Aitken, “The 
Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263 at 272: “There is 
sound moral sense in not depriving the possessor of his or her interest in a chattel 
until it is positively acquired by someone else.” 
45 J Griffiths-Baker, “Divesting Abandonment: An Unnecessary Concept?” (2007) 
36(1) Common Law World Review 16 at 23 [footnotes omitted]. 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ Abandonment and Passing of Property in Trash 155 
 
abandonment, the doctrine itself – ie, the absolute relinquishment of 
both possession and ownership – was already the subject of much 
discussion, and indeed controversy, in earlier times. 
D. England 
25 Likewise, there was also a divergence of views in England. 
English law was, on the one hand, quite reluctant to recognise that 
property in chattels could be abandoned. As Sir Frederick Pollock 
famously noted, it is a “high, grave and dubious question whether a man 
can by the common law so fully disclaim and abandon his own goods 
that they cease, by the mere declaration of his will, coupled or not 
coupled with a physical act equivalent to jettison, to be in any sense his 
property”.46 In other words, ownership and possession of goods could 
never be absolutely vacant in law; instead, “an express abandonment is, 
in point of law, merely a licence to the first man who will take the goods 
for his own, which taking will be justified and will finally change the 
property if complete before the taker has notice that the licence is 
revoked”.47 
26 This rather limited view of the law of abandonment – which 
clearly rejects the notion of a “unilateral divesting abandonment” – 
merely echoes what Pollock had earlier articulated in his celebrated 
co-authored work entitled An Essay on Possession in the Common Law.48 
Here, the learned authors expressed the view that there seemed to be 
“hardly any case in which possession once vested [could] be absolutely 
extinguished, except by the destruction of the thing either in fact or in 
law”.49 They further explained that the right to possession (or 
“constructive possession”), being “one of the constituent elements of the 
complete right of property”, “is said not to be lost, even by a general 
abandonment of the thing”.50 In other words, the physical abandonment 
(or the mere dispossession) of a chattel, even with the intent to so act, is 
                                                                       
46 (1894) 10 LQR 293, a case note on Arrow Shipping Co Ltd v Tyne Improvement 
Commissioners [1894] AC 508. See also J E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1997) at p 79: under the strict common law position, 
“property cannot be abandoned de jure, if that means that an owner may by his act 
alone destroy his title in a thing. An owner may only relinquish possession of a 
thing, whereupon any subsequent person’s possession may give him a good root of 
title”. 
47 F Pollock (1894) 10 LQR 293. See also L Aitken, “The Abandonment and 
Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263 at 272. 
48 F Pollock & R S Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1888; FB Rothman & Co, 1985). 
49 F Pollock & R S Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1888; FB Rothman & Co, 1985) at p 123. 
50 F Pollock & R S Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1888; FB Rothman & Co, 1985) at p 145, citing Charles Viner,  
A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (2nd Ed) vol 22 at p 409 (“Waife”). 
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insufficient to divest the owner of his proprietary interest in it. The 
owner who has parted with possession is, nevertheless, by virtue of his 
right to possession, entitled to sue – in trespass, trover (the old action 
for conversion) or detinue – a stranger who has taken the chattel 
without his consent. 
27 There is also some support for this view in early English case 
law. For example, Lord Coke in Haynes’s Case was of the view that  
“a man cannot relinquish the property he hath to his goods, unless they 
be vested in another”.51 In this case, Haynes had dug up four corpses and 
took the shrouds with him. It was held that the shrouds remained the 
property of those who owned them before the burial and the taking by 
Haynes amounted to larceny (theft). A buried corpse, by extension, 
remained in the possession of the deceased person’s representatives or of 
the person who had buried the deceased, and is thereby not abandoned. 
Similarly, in R v Edwards and Stacey,52 the carcasses of three pigs which 
had been bitten by a mad dog and therefore buried were held to be still 
in the possession of the person to whom they had belonged. Arguably, 
the right to property in “abandoned” goods remains with the original 
owner, at least until those goods are taken into lawful possession by 
another person (eg, by way of a gift).53 
28 On the other hand, an alternative (and more robust) view of 
abandonment was proffered by Sir William Blackstone, who, in 
Commentaries on the Laws of England,54 maintained that “unilateral 
divesting abandonment” was an entirely plausible concept at common 
law. Blackstone asserted thus:55 
Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired 
by the first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he 
intends to appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by 
the principles of universal law, till such time as he does some other act 
which shows an intention to abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally 
                                                                       
51 (1614) 77 ER 1389. 
52 (1877) 13 Cox CC 384. 
53 Cf also Charles Viner, A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (2nd Ed) vol 22  
at p 409 (“Waife”); C St Germain, Doctor and Student (T F T Plucknett & 
J L Barton eds) (London: Seldon Society, 1974) Book II, ch 51 at pp 290–292). 
54 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 Books) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1765–1769). 
55 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Book 2) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1766) (“Book 2”) ch 1 at p 9. See also W Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (Book 1) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) ch 8 at p 285: “[A] man 
that scatters his treasure into the sea, or upon the public surface of the earth, is 
construed to have absolutely abandoned his property, and returned it into the 
common stock, without any intention of reclaiming it; and therefore it belongs, as 
in a state of nature, to the first occupant, or finder.” See, further, Book 2, ch 26  
at p 402, as well as Farwell J in Attorney General v Trustees of the British Museum 
[1903] 2 Ch 598 at 608–609. 
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speaking, publici juris once more, and is liable to be again 
appropriated by the next occupant. So if one is possessed of a jewel, 
and casts it into the sea or a public highway, this is such an express 
dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder 
that will seize it to his own use. [emphasis added] 
29 Blackstone’s view that an absolute abandonment of property is 
possible subject to the clear “intentions” of the original owner and 
subsequent occupatio by a third party “finder” also finds support in a 
number of (albeit dated) judicial authorities in relation to wreck.56 Most 
notably, in Arrow Shipping Co Ltd v Tyne Improvement Commissioners 
(The Crystal),57 the House of Lords held that an owner of a vessel may, at 
common law, abandon a wrecked/sunken ship and so put an end to his 
liabilities. It seemed clear to Lord Herschell LC that the owners of The 
Crystal “had abandoned the vessel as derelict on the high seas, without 
any intention of resuming possession or ownership”.58 
30 Indeed, there appears to be authority in other areas of the law 
(apart from these early cases on the law of wreck) which supports a 
more liberal interpretation of abandonment. In criminal law, for 
example, Professor Hudson observed in a famous article59 that several 
decisions from earlier times had unreservedly endorsed the notion of 
“divesting abandonment”.60 In disagreeing with the reasoning and 
decision in Haynes’s Case (which, if followed, could well lead to 
“curious” results), Professor Hudson opined that the treatment of 
“divesting abandonment” in criminal law “appears to have been 
markedly more satisfactory than an unqualified application of the rule 
in Haynes’s Case would have been and, indeed, on the present state of 
                                                                       
56 See Brown v Mallett (1848) 5 CB 599 at 617; White v Crisp (1854) 10 Ex 312 at 322. 
57 [1894] AC 508. 
58 Arrow Shipping Co Ltd v Tyne Improvement Commissioners (The Crystal) [1894]  
AC 508 at 519. See also at p 521 (per Lord Watson), pp 532–533 (per Lord 
MacNaghten) and p 534 (per Lord Morris). It may be usefully noted that the 
owners in this case had also given notice of abandonment to the underwriters. As 
such, the owners, having been divested of all proprietary interest in the wrecked 
vessel, could not therefore be held liable for the wreck removal expenses. For a 
more recent example, see Pierce v Bemis (The Lusitania) [1986] QB 384. 
59 A H Hudson, “Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law?” (1984)  
100 LQR 110 at 113 et seq. 
60 In particular, these cases suggest that ownership in chattels can be abandoned with 
divesting effect, although strong evidence of abandonment is required and that this 
would normally be found as regards articles of trivial value – see R v Peters (1843) 
1 Car & K 245; R v Reed (1842) Car & M 307 at 307–308; R v White (1912)  
107 LT 528 at 529. There is also authority for the view that abandonment is 
possible in equity – see Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s dicta in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 708 (“[i]f the settlor has expressly, or 
by necessary implication, abandoned any beneficial interest in the trust property, 
there is in my view no resulting trust: the undisposed-of equitable interest vests in 
the Crown as bona vacantia”). 
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the authorities the case seems to have been repeatedly, if impliedly, 
overruled in criminal law from which it originated”.61 The learned 
author’s conclusion that “not only is divesting abandonment desirable, 
subject to safeguards of proof, but it is also possible”62 further accords 
with the views of other commentators.63 
31 The present author is also inclined to the view that the common 
law ought to recognise and give effect to the concept of “unilateral 
divesting abandonment”, as it does the somewhat related doctrine of 
“waiver” (albeit not without controversy).64 Like abandonment, 
a “waiver” is essentially an unequivocal and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right and, when properly analysed, 
operates to cause the right to lapse, rather than to transfer the 
enjoyment of that right from one person to another. What truly 
matters in each case is how proof of abandonment (like proof of 
waiver) is to be established – the factual determination of a specific and 
unequivocal intention to abandon to all and sundry (derelictio cum 
occupatione),65 coupled with the overt act of abandonment itself. 
However, given the various safeguards as to strict proof (instances of 
which will be discussed below in relation to waste disposal), it is 
envisaged that a finding of “unilateral divesting abandonment”, although 
plausible in principle, “may well not be of frequent occurrence”.66 
                                                                       
61 (1984) 100 LQR 110 at 116. 
62 (1984) 100 LQR 110 at 119. 
63 See J E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) at p 79: 
“Do we have the right to abandon the things we own? … Although the legal view 
[eg, in Haynes’s Case (1614) 77 ER 1389] respecting title might suggest otherwise, it 
is submitted that we do have the right to abandon property. It is surely part of a 
right to determine how a thing is to be used that one may make no use of it at all, 
for evermore. One ought not to be saddled with a relationship to a thing that one 
does not want, and an unbreakable relation to a thing would condemn the owner 
to having to deal with it. It would indeed be a funny turn of events if … property in 
essence gave the things a person owned a power over him.” Halsbury’s also 
maintains that a true owner can “intentionally abandon” a chattel, thereby 
divesting himself of title to the chattel without having to contemplate a transfer of 
it to someone else – see Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 2 (Butterworths LexisNexis, 
4th Ed Reissue, 1991) at para 1811 (on the subject of “bailment by finding”). 
64 For a masterful commentary on the law of waiver, see S Wilken, Wilken and 
Villiers: The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Ed, 2002). 
65 Writing in the field of medical law (and specifically in relation to “surplus” tissue 
after surgery or diagnostic testing), one commentator notes that the notion of 
abandonment, although supported by the Nuffield Council and various other 
commentators (eg, L Skene, “Proprietary Rights in Human Bodies, Body Parts and 
Tissue: Regulatory Contexts and Proposals for New Laws” (2002) 22(1) LS 102), “is 
inappropriate in the absence of a clear intention to relinquish all interests in the 
property” [emphasis added] (D Price, “From Cosmos and Damian to Van Velzen: 
The Human Tissue Saga Continues” (2003) 11 Medical Law Review 1 at 31). 
66 A H Hudson, “Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law?” (1984)  
100 LQR 110 at 119. 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ Abandonment and Passing of Property in Trash 159 
 
Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested,67 it matters not whether the 
common law recognises the concept of divesting abandonment because 
the issue of abandonment can also be explained and resolved by the 
application of other legal doctrines, such as sale, gift, contract and (in 
particular) estoppel.68 Although there is some force to this argument, it 
should be mentioned, in retrospect, that not all cases of abandonment 
will invariably fit within the strict legal contours of a sale, gift or 
contract,69 whilst estoppel is, at heart, an equitable concept that is 
premised upon rather different considerations (namely, reliance, good 
faith/conscience and justice). Finally, the point has also been made that 
the justification for recognising the unilateral nature of abandonment 
lies rooted in the notion of individual autonomy and empowerment.70 It 
is therefore submitted that it is eminently rational for the common law 
to independently recognise and give effect to the doctrine of “unilateral 
divesting abandonment”.71 
32 Be that as it may, it is apposite to observe, in the specific context 
of rubbish disposal (to which our discussion now turns), that English 
law has consistently maintained the view that there is no question of 
abandonment when a homeowner merely puts rubbish out for 
collection. Indeed, rubbish which has been deposited in domestic waste 
receptacles or in trash bags left by the curbside belongs to the 
homeowner until collected, whereupon ownership passes to the waste 
collection authority. The decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
Williams v Phillips72 is the leading authority in this regard.73 Here, the 
                                                                       
67 See J Griffiths-Baker, “Divesting Abandonment: An Unnecessary Concept?” (2007) 
36(1) Common Law World Review 16 at 23 et seq. The author concludes thus  
(at pp 25–26): “The foregoing analysis suggests that there is no need for the law to 
employ the concept of divesting abandonment to explain how ownership in 
abandoned property passes. As the discussion of the Commonwealth cases shows, 
much can be said for dealing with such situations through the concepts of gift, sale, 
contract and estoppel, rather than divesting abandonment. … In conclusion, 
therefore, the concept of divesting abandonment is unnecessary and has no obvious 
role to play. This may, in part, explain the dearth of English cases in this area.” 
68 For a recent illustration on how the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may be 
pleaded, albeit unsuccessfully, against a (long overdue) claim for a share of 
copyright royalties in a musical work, see Fisher v Brooker [2009] 1 WLR 1764. 
69 See the examples cited by Sir William Blackstone at para 28 of this article. 
70 See J E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) at p 79. 
71 Cf also the judicial sentiments expressed in North America, Australia and New 
Zealand on this matter, discussed above. 
72 (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 5. 
73 There are, of course, more recent examples. In December 1992, a private detective 
was fined £150 for taking a newspaper executive’s domestic refuse as part of an 
industrial espionage plot (see <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/private-
detective-stole-editors-rubbish-bags-1564956.html> (accessed 3 January 2011) and 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/detective-fined-for-rubbish-theft-1565100. 
html> (accessed 3 January 2011)). There was also the case of Benjamin Pell 
(dubbed “Benji the Binman” by the press) that occurred in December 1999 
wherein Pell was convicted of theft of confidential waste and fined £20 (see 
(cont’d on the next page) 
160 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2011) 23 SAcLJ 
 
defendants, who were employed as refuse collectors, had removed for 
their own benefit certain commercially valuable items which they found 
in the rubbish they had collected on behalf of their employer (a practice 
known as “totting”). The defendants were charged with and convicted of 
larceny (theft).74 The learned Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard, was of 
the following opinion (which merits a full citation):75 
The first point that is taken here, that the property was abandoned, is 
on the face of it untenable. Of course, that is not so. If I put refuse in 
my dustbin outside my house, I am not abandoning it in the sense that 
I am leaving it for anybody to take it away. I am putting it out so that it 
may be collected and taken away by the local authority, and until it has 
been taken away by the local authority it is my property. It is my property 
and I can take it back and prevent anybody else from taking it away. It is 
simply put there for the Corporation or the local authority, as the case 
may be, to come and clear it away. Once the Corporation come and 
clear it away, it seems to me that because I intended it to pass from 
myself to them, it becomes their property. Therefore, there is no ground 
                                                                                                                               
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/man-obsessed-with-rubbish-fined-for-aitken-
papers-theft-1132292.html> (accessed 3 January 2011)). As the judge said when 
convicting Pell: “You are well aware now that what people throw away still belongs 
to someone, and that when they put discarded paper among their rubbish that still 
belongs to them. I don’t think I need say anything further.” More recently, William 
Willis admitted to stealing household items from Calderdale Council waste site in 
Halifax in October 2008. He was subsequently given a community order for  
12 months with 50 hours of unpaid work and ordered to pay £60 costs (see <http:// 
www.halifaxcourier.co.uk/news/Rubbish-thief.4581488.jp> (accessed 3 January 
2011) and <http://www.halifaxcourier.co.uk/news/Man-caught-stealing-rubbish-
from.4638143.jp> (accessed 3 January 2011)). 
74 As Lord Goddard CJ famously said in Ellerman’s Wilson Line Ltd v Webster [1952] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 179 at 180: “[Y]ou cannot be charged with stealing abandoned 
property.” 
75 (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 5 at 8. Cf Anstead J, dissenting, in State of Florida v Schultz 
388 So 2d 1326 at 1330 (1980): “In my view, a homeowner, upon placing items in a 
closed garbage container and placing the container in a position on his property 
where the container can be conveniently removed by authorized trash collectors, is 
entitled to reasonably expect that the container and the trash therein will be 
removed from his property only by those authorized to do so, and that such trash will 
be disposed of in the manner provided by ordinance or private contract. By sealing 
the containers in a secure manner and placing the containers on his own property, 
the owner has done everything within his own means to insure the privacy of the 
contents thereof, short of delivering the containers to a central disposal site 
himself.” [emphasis added] Cf, further, Ang J’s remarks in Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd 
v Obegi Melissa [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [27]: “Putting rubbish out for collection by 
refuse collection personnel is not an abandonment because there is no intent to 
relinquish the goods absolutely but only conditionally for the purpose of such 
collection.” Also, see [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [31]: “[T]he plaintiffs retained the 
right to possess the documents even while they were in the bin centre awaiting 
collection. To my mind, there was no doubt that if, at any stage prior to collection, 
the plaintiffs had asked for the trash to be returned, they would have been well 
entitled to the same.” See also A Reed & B Fitzpatrick, Criminal Law (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2006) at p 444. 
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for saying that this is abandoned property. As long as the property 
remains on the owner’s premises, it cannot be abandoned property. It 
is a wholly untenable proposition to say that refuse which a householder 
puts out to be taken away is abandoned. Very likely he does not want it 
himself and that is why he puts it in the dustbin. He puts it in the 
dustbin, not so that anybody can come along and take it, but so that the 
Corporation can come along and take it. [emphasis added] 
33 In rejecting the notion of abandonment, Lord Goddard 
preferred to equate the act of rubbish disposal with the making of a 
“gift” (which entails an intentional transfer of property by delivery). The 
homeowner, instead of abandoning his rubbish res derelictae to all and 
sundry, is taken to have made an outright “gift” of it to the trash 
collector. Accordingly, the trash collector’s subsequent collection and 
disposal of the trash at a designated facility can be viewed simply as an 
extension of the homeowner’s own interest and purpose in disposing of 
his trash by the curbside (which would, in any event, accord with the 
homeowner’s original intentions).76 
34 The numerous cases of theft in England arising from dumpster 
diving demonstrate that English criminal law – whilst recognising the 
existence of the doctrine of “divesting abandonment” – does not so 
readily infer, from the mere fact that rubbish has been put out for 
collection, an intention on the part of the homeowner to 
unconditionally abandon the rubbish.77 Indeed, one must assume that 
homeowners do not ordinarily abandon their rubbish to all and sundry 
and for all purposes (even if they intend to make no further use of the 
rubbish themselves), but instead intend for their rubbish to be dealt 
                                                                       
76 See also J E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press, 1997)  
at pp 88–90. In particular, Penner asserts thus (at p 89): “[W]hen we give 
something to someone, we treat the use of the donee as our own use. A gift 
constitutes the ultimate adoption of another’s use as one’s own. … The important 
point about gifts is that, even though final and ultimate, they essentially refer to the 
donor’s intentions and purposes, and so are to be regarded as dispositions of his 
property.” [emphasis in original] And further (at p 90): “Giving is not mere 
abandonment of property to others, involving no interests of the donor.” In 
making a gift of property (as opposed to merely abandoning it), the donor still 
retains an interest in the way the donee chooses to deal with the property (even 
though the donor cannot determine, nor have any control over, precisely how the 
property ought to be used), because the donee’s use/disposition of the property 
nevertheless implicates the interests of the donor. See, further, Halsbury’s Laws of 
England vol 35 (Butterworths LexisNexis, 4th Ed Reissue, 1994) at para 1225: 
“Abandonment of goods takes place when possession of them is quitted voluntarily 
without any intention of transferring them to another.” 
77 Interestingly, s 60 of the UK Environmental Protection Act 1990 (c 43) actually 
prescribes that it is an offence to interfere with (“sort over or disturb”) the contents 
of waste receptacles provided by a waste collection authority (whether for public or 
private use), unless prior permission has been obtained from the waste collection 
authority. 
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with in the anticipated and usual fashion. In the case of rubbish left in 
waste receptacles outside one’s home or in the common rubbish dump 
of a building, this would normally entail proper collection and disposal 
by the local authority.78 It is inconceivable, for reasons which will be 
canvassed below, that a homeowner would have intended to grant a 
“licence to the first man”79 to take these trash bags as his own – ie, that 
the owner of trash is completely indifferent as to who may subsequently 
appropriate the contents of his trash bags. More likely, it is the 
homeowner’s intention to convey property in the rubbish specifically 
and directly to the trash collector for subsequent disposal at a 
designated facility.80 But up until then, the trash bags remain the 
property of the homeowner who continues to exercise (not actual but 
constructive) control over them, thereby retaining the intention to 
exclude others from interfering with his trash.81 
IV. Rubbish disposal and abandonment in Singapore: A suggested 
approach 
35 Having examined the judicial and academic treatment of the 
law of abandonment in several different jurisdictions, we now turn to 
the Singapore context in our attempt to answer the question which was 
posed at the outset of this article: to what extent does the act of rubbish 
disposal – whether in trash bags left by the curbside outside one’s home 
or at the common rubbish dump of a residential/commercial building – 
indicate a clear and specific intention on the part of the owner to 
abandon not just possession of the property, but also ownership thereof? 
From the foregoing analysis, there appears to be stark disparities in 
judicial opinion as to whether there is any incidence of “divesting 
abandonment” whenever rubbish is disposed of in such a manner. The 
courts in the US and Canada have consistently answered this question in 
the affirmative, whilst the converse is true for the English courts. The 
present author, however, submits that the latter view is more defensible 
and hence preferable. 
                                                                       
78 “Trash bags on the curb might be considered as abandoned property. True, 
abandoned property is available to anyone who finds it. But trash bags were put on 
the curb with the reasonable expectation that the municipal trash collection service – 
and no one else – would pick up the bags and dispose of them anonymously. … 
Trash is not abandoned property, because it is not available to anyone who finds 
it.” [emphasis in original] (see <http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm> (accessed 
3 January 2011)) 
79 Adopting the language of Sir Frederick Pollock in (1894) 10 LQR 293. 
80 This view arguably accords with the Proculian notion of traditio incertae personae 
in Roman law. 
81 Cf Pollock and Wright’s explanation of “constructive possession” in F Pollock & 
R S Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888; FB Rothman & Co, 1985) at p 145. 
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36 It may well be that when trash is deposited in receptacles by the 
curbside for subsequent collection and disposal, the intuitive feel is that 
such property must be deemed abandoned by its original owner, who 
takes no further interest in what actually happens to it. After all, as 
Justice White reminds us, “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic 
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible 
to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public”.82 However, this perception is likely to have been premised upon 
a mere gut reaction, without more. It is plausible, as this author 
respectfully suggests, that the views adopted by the US judiciary insofar 
as the doctrine of abandonment in the property law context is 
concerned have been coloured somewhat by their own views vis-à-vis 
abandonment in the constitutional, Fourth Amendment context. 
Because the owner of trash which has been made accessible to members 
of the public (such trash being placed for collection in an unsecured, 
public area) cannot reasonably claim to possess a legitimate expectation 
of privacy thereto,83 the owner must likewise be taken to have 
unconditionally abandoned all proprietary rights in the trash to all and 
sundry.84 
37 To this argument that depositing trash bags by the curbside or 
in unsecured waste receptacles would seriously jeopardise the 
homeowner’s proprietary claim in conversion against a third party 
dumpster diver, the response is fairly pragmatic. The rubbish has been 
so deposited by the homeowner – albeit in a manner that is accessible to 
the public – for the specific purpose of garbage collection. Indeed, would 
it be practicable for trash collectors to discharge their responsibilities if 
these trash bags had instead been left within the property confines of 
the home (or, otherwise, in an area which is not readily accessible to 
others)? As one online commentator perceptively pointed out:85 
The reason that trash bags are placed outside the curtilage is that 
municipal ordinances require trash to be placed at the curb, for the 
convenience of collection personnel, so trash can be collected in an 
efficient and orderly way. The choice of location is not an expression 
of residents’ desires to forfeit any privacy interest in the contents of 
their trash. [emphasis in original] 
38 Therefore, a homeowner who puts rubbish out for collection 
does not evince a clear and specific intention to abandon it as much as 
he needs to accomplish a practical and necessary step for the garbage to 
be taken away for disposal. Putting rubbish out for collection represents 
                                                                       
82 California v Greenwood 486 US 35 at 40 (1988). 
83 See California v Greenwood 486 US 35 (1988). 
84 See the discussion of US case law at paras 11–15 of this article. 
85 See <http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011). See also 
Sharpe v Turley 191 SW 3d 362 at 368 (2006). 
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the most practical means of waste disposal, particularly for the domestic 
waste generator. 
39 On further reflection, there may indeed be other compelling 
reasons why homeowners are not always entirely indifferent as to the 
fate of their domestic waste (ie, as to who may come along and 
appropriate the contents of their trash bags). Conventional wisdom 
dictates that property which has been abandoned as utter trash is 
generally regarded as having no commercial value (or zero economic 
value) in the hands of the original owner.86 It is obviously much more 
difficult to infer that there is an intention to abandon a valuable chattel 
as opposed to a less valuable one. However, not all domestic waste is 
necessarily valueless or worthless. The homeowner may well have 
disposed of documents (even if economically worthless to him) which 
contain private or confidential information, or information that is 
otherwise of some personal value or importance to him. Some examples 
may include identity card numbers, dates of birth, credit card bills with 
credit card numbers, bank account details, passwords, medical history 
and medical prescriptions, personal letters and photographs, etc.87 The 
intrinsic value in such forms of information can serve as a significant 
commodity in its own right and this is particularly true as regards 
                                                                       
86 “Putting material in the garbage signifies that the material is no longer something 
of value or importance to the person disposing of it, and that there is no reason or 
need to retain it.” (per Rowles JA in the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v 
Krist (1995) 42 CR (4th) 159 at [28]) 
87 An online commentator has compiled a (non-exhaustive) list of items in 
household trash which people would routinely regard as private or personal (see 
<http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011)): 
(1) empty prescription medicine bottles, which are always labelled with 
the individual’s name and may be labelled with the name and dosage of the 
drug, so that someone who searches the trash may infer the individual’s 
medical condition. Particularly in the case of sexually-transmitted diseases or 
psychiatric disorder, disclosure of the individual’s medical condition could 
cause embarrassment; 
(2) credit card receipts, which have the person’s name and credit card 
data; someone who searches the trash could use these data to order 
merchandise by telephone; 
(3) letters that contain confidential information on financial, political, 
religious, family, or romantic topics; 
(4) empty containers of alcoholic beverages, which could be 
embarrassing in a town with a substantial number of people who disapprove 
of alcohol for religious or moral reasons; 
(5) empty boxes for condoms, birth control pill packages, empty 
containers of spermicide, and other contraceptive materials that could be 
embarrassing, but are legal to possess and use; 
(6) telephone invoices, with a list of all long-distance numbers called, 
with the date and duration of the call; 
(7) paper indicating membership in political or religious groups. 
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private and sensitive information concerning celebrities and other 
public figures.88 
40 The retort to this might well be that if a homeowner truly wants 
to retain ownership of his trash, he ought to have taken affirmative steps 
to do so. Insofar as private and sensitive information is concerned, it 
may be argued that even more effort and vigilance is required to protect 
such information from abandonment – eg, by ensuring that all 
confidential documents are shredded or destroyed prior to disposal.89 
The question, of course, is whether the generator of trash ought to be 
saddled with such a duty. Must individual homeowners, over and above 
all corporate tenants in commercial buildings, adopt such costly and 
cumbersome security measures (such as investing in a paper shredder) 
or be otherwise penalised for their nonchalance and deprived of their 
property rights in trash which has been put out for collection?90 Notably, 
the UK has an answer to this conundrum in the guise of s 11(1) of  
the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, which states that 
“[c]ontributory negligence is no defence in proceedings founded on 
conversion, or on intentional trespass to goods”. This, it is submitted, 
must be the right approach to adopt as the carelessness of the garbage 
generator should in no way affect his (common law) ownership rights in 
property.91 
                                                                       
88 As the anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, resolving dumpster diving issues 
through the vehicle of property law is certainly not the most ideal proposition in 
every case, especially given the varying approaches to the application of the 
doctrine of abandonment. This is perhaps where the law of privacy (or the law 
protecting private/personal, as opposed to confidential, information) – as yet 
undeveloped in Singapore – may have a useful role to play. However, owing to 
constraints of space, an exploration of this fascinating area of the law in relation to 
dumpster diving will have to be undertaken elsewhere. 
89 “When people place … personal items in an opaque plastic bag on the curb for 
trash collection, they are expressing their continuing expectation of privacy. 
However, the holdings of [US] courts that there is no expectation of privacy for 
garbage means that, to protect their privacy, individuals must purchase and 
routinely use a paper shredder to destroy receipts and letters, before placing them 
in the trash. Other materials, such as containers of prescription medicine, are more 
difficult to destroy beyond recognition. Instead of requiring such contortions from 
individuals, the law should recognize the wrongfulness of such intrusions into 
garbage.” (see <http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011)) 
90 “A common way for people to steal credit card numbers (in the days before 
electronic processing of credit card transactions) was to rummage through the 
trash of retail merchants and find the carbon paper from credit card receipts. Who 
has committed the greater wrong: (1) the business who carelessly discarded 
confidential information or (2) the punk who deliberately searched through 
garbage in search of the confidential information to use for unlawful purposes?” 
(see <http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm> (accessed 3 January 2011)) 
91 The garbage generator’s carelessness in failing to safeguard the confidentiality of 
the information found in trash should only, if at all, affect his claim in equity 
against the third party dumpster diver for breach of confidence. See, in this regard, 
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117; Malone v Metropolitan Police 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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41 Let us reconsider the above retort. If it were true that a 
homeowner who wants to retain ownership of his trash must take 
affirmative steps to do so, then, logically, the clearest manifestation of 
this intention to exclude others from interfering must take the form of a 
notice/label (to be pasted on the waste receptacle) to the effect that all 
trash bags deposited therein remain the property of the homeowner 
until their collection by the trash collector and have not, in fact, been 
abandoned. Is it, however, necessary for the homeowner to go to such 
lengths to notify the public of his intentions regarding the fate of the 
rubbish of which he has disposed? This would appear to be a ludicrous 
proposition.92 The analogy to this, by extension, would be to argue that 
just because a copyright owner – who has uploaded a copyright work on 
the Internet for others to access (thereby making the work available to 
the public) – has not explicitly declared on his website that he intends to 
assert copyright in the work (eg, by clearly displaying the relevant © 
notice), he is deemed to have abandoned his copyright such that any 
internet user can then gain unencumbered access to the work and 
exploit it for all purposes. Again, an absurd proposition. 
42 Therefore, the better view must be that putting rubbish out for 
collection – contrary to US case authorities – does not amount to an 
abandonment of ownership rights in trash. In addition to all the reasons 
cited above, it could further be argued that the act of rubbish disposal, 
in and of itself, is far too equivocal in establishing a specific intention on 
the part of the original owner to abandon property. Unsurprisingly, 
rubbish disposal can be effected by someone other than the true owner 
himself – eg, by people over whom the owner has control or influence, 
such as a domestic helper (in the case of private dwellings) or an office 
secretary (in a commercial setting). Let us assume that the domestic 
helper or office secretary had inadvertently discarded a bag full of 
confidential documents, thinking that it was a pile of wastepaper. 
Fortunately, the owner discovers the mistake prior to refuse collection. Is 
it, however, right to suggest that the mere act of putting trash bags out 
for collection (not by the owner himself but by his mistaken domestic 
helper or office secretary, as the case may be) is a sufficiently strong and, 
                                                                                                                               
Commissioner (No 2) [1979] Ch 344; Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd 
[1984] 1 WLR 892. See also United States v Thomas 864 F 2d 843 at 845 (1989); 
City of St Paul v Vaughn 306 Minn 337 (1975). 
92 Cf the dicta of Justice Lang-Miers in Sharpe v Turley 191 SW 3d 362 at 368 (2006): 
“Sharpe contends that the items were in a publicly accessible dumpster, that the 
Diocese did not post a ‘No Trespassing’ sign, did not object to his removal of the 
items until after his deposition had been taken, did not order confidential disposal 
to protect privacy, and did not prosecute Sharpe for taking the items. But whether 
or not a ‘no trespassing’ sign was posted on the dumpster is not determinative of 
whether the items were abandoned. The absence of a ‘no trespassing’ sign on 
private property does not mean that the owner gives the public permission to enter 
and remove items from that property.” 
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more importantly, unambiguous indication of the owner’s intention to 
voluntarily abandon ownership of those documents? Surely not. Indeed, 
if the very act of rubbish disposal so clearly indicates an abandonment 
of property rights in trash, then why is there a need for dumpster divers 
and private investigators to adopt such surreptitious and covert 
measures in obtaining information from the trash bin? 
43 Because proof of an intention to abandon property is, 
ultimately, a factual inquiry, an arbiter of fact may well reach a different 
conclusion if the homeowner, instead of depositing trash bags at the 
curbside just outside his home, chooses to dump them on a public street 
some distance away, in the middle of a public highway or right into the 
open sea. It must be fairly common to observe, in many parts of the 
world, pieces of worn-out furniture (eg, sofas and chairs) or dilapidated 
and broken-down vehicles left along the roadside in some rural part of 
town. The circumstances surrounding the discarding of these chattels 
should raise the irresistible inference that the original owners had clearly 
abandoned them – both possession and ownership. In any event, it is 
reasonable to assume that someone who discards a chair in the middle 
of nowhere can envision any passer-by picking it up, and to this, he has 
no objections at all.93 The same, however, cannot be said for trash bags 
left in waste receptacles outside residential property, especially when the 
“finder” arguably knows to whom those bags belong. 
44 If the preferable approach for Singapore is that there is no 
question of abandonment whenever rubbish is put out for collection, 
then it must follow that all the rubbish deposited in domestic waste 
receptacles or at the common rubbish dump of a residential/commercial 
building, pending collection, remains the property of the original 
owner. This view is, of course, in keeping with the general approach 
taken by the English courts.94 Ownership in trash will pass only at the 
point of collection, as it must be the garbage generator’s intention to 
convey property in the rubbish directly to the trash collector – and to no 
one else – for subsequent disposal. 
45 There is also additional legislative support for this  
proposition in Singapore. Reference may be made to the Environmental 
Public Health Act 198795 and specifically to ss 8(2)(a) and 16(1) 
                                                                       
93 This is similar to the case where a finder chances upon and appropriates property 
which appears to have been “lost” by its original owner (who cannot be identified 
and located), whereupon it becomes the property of the finder – see Armory v 
Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra 505; Bridges v Hawkesworth (1851) 21 LJQB 75; Moffatt v 
Kazana [1969] 2 QB 152; Parker v British Airways Board [1982] 1 All ER 834. 
94 See, in particular, Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 5, as well as the 
discussion of English case law at paras 25–34 of this article. 
95 Cap 95, 2002 Rev Ed. Cf also s 60 of the UK Environmental Protection Act 1990 
(c 43). 
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thereof.96 Section 8(2)(a) provides that “no person other than a waste 
collector licensee whose specified area in its licence includes premises in 
the area shall collect or remove any refuse or waste”, whereas s 16(1) 
states that “[a]ll refuse, waste and filth of every sort and any matter or 
thing collected by the employees, contractors or agents of the Agency 
from streets, buildings or any premises or place or brought by any 
person to any public disposal facility shall be the property of the Agency 
which may sell or dispose of the refuse, waste and filth as it thinks fit”.97 
In other words, there is existing legislation in Singapore to the effect that 
only the authorised trash collector (and no one else, let alone a 
dumpster diver) is allowed to collect and remove refuse from designated 
premises, and that the refuse so collected becomes, by law, the property 
of the local authority (namely, the National Environment Agency). 
V. Abandonment of intellectual property rights 
46 The discussion in this next part of the article focuses on how 
the notion of abandonment – as it is understood and applied in relation 
to physical property – may also operate in the realm of intangible 
property. For example, under what circumstances can it be said that an 
owner of intellectual property (“IP”) has unconditionally abandoned 
the ownership of his IP? We will briefly examine this question in the 
context of the law of trade marks and the law of copyright. We have 
seen, from the earlier analysis, that the burden of proof for the defence 
of abandonment is a relatively onerous one. Much turns on whether the 
defendant is able to establish, on the facts, a specific and unequivocal 
intention on the part of the original owner to abandon the property in 
question. It appears that the same exacting standard is required for the 
abandonment of IP rights. 
47 According to Chitty J in Mouson & Co v Boehm,98 “the question 
of abandonment [of a trade mark] is one of intention to be inferred 
from the facts of the particular case”. And although the non-use of a 
trade mark per se cannot be equated with an act of abandonment, it has 
been held that lengthy periods of non-use (21 years in this instance) 
may, by inference, support a claim that the trade mark in question has 
                                                                       
96 See also s 12(1) of the Environmental Public Health Act (Cap 95, 2002 Rev Ed) 
which suggests that it is the homeowner who assumes responsibility for the refuse 
generated in the home and, by extension, for the refuse that is subsequently 
deposited in waste receptacles left by the curbside, at least until the time of refuse 
collection. 
97 Section 2 of the Environmental Public Health Act (Cap 95, 2002 Rev Ed) defines 
“Agency” to mean “the National Environment Agency established under the 
National Environment Agency Act 2002 (Act 4 of 2002)”. 
98 (1884) 26 Ch D 398 at 405. 
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been abandoned.99 These judicial sentiments also find support in statute 
law. Insofar as registered trade marks are concerned, it is possible for a 
proprietor to abandon and lose these registered rights by the non-use of 
a trade mark for a continuous period of five years.100 
48 Turning to the law of copyright, the courts in the US have long 
recognised that a copyright owner may voluntarily abandon his 
copyright. Whilst it is true that the provisions of the US Copyright Act 
1976 are silent on this matter, there is a widely held judicial view of 
abandonment.101 For example, the 9th Circuit in Hampton v Paramount 
Pictures Corp was of the following opinion:102 
Rights gained under the Copyright Law … may be abandoned. 
Abandonment of such rights, however, must be manifested by some 
overt act indicative of a purpose to surrender the rights and allow the 
public to copy. 
49 What is, however, more controversial under US law is whether 
there is any possibility of a limited or partial abandonment of copyright, 
“such as an abandonment only in a particular medium, or only as 
regards a given mode of presentation”.103 The courts have generally either 
rejected the doctrine of limited abandonment without explanation or 
determined that the doctrine need not be addressed because of 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of abandonment by the 
copyright owner.104 
50 The law in England appears to mirror that in the US. According 
to Copinger and Skone James on Copyright,105 “an author may by his 
conduct, or by his express desire, abandon his copyright, and give to the 
public a right to publish his work before the time when his copyright 
                                                                       
99 See Re Fortuna-Werke Spezialmaschinenfabrik AG’s Application [1957] RPC 84 at 88. 
See also Silverman v CBS Inc 870 F 2d 40 at 45–47 (1989). 
100 See, eg, Singapore Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) s 22(1)(a). 
101 See the discussion of US case law in M B Nimmer & D Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright (Matthew Bender, Rev Ed) at para 13.06 (“The Defence of Abandonment 
of Copyright”). 
102 279 F 2d 100 at 104 (1960). See also National Comics Publications, Inc v Fawcett 
Publications, Inc 191 F 2d 594 at 598 (1951). 
103 M B Nimmer & D Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (Matthew Bender, Rev Ed)  
at para 13.06. 
104 See, eg, Paramount Pictures Corp v Carol Publishing Group 11 F Supp 2d 329 at 337 
(1998). Contra L P Loren, “Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: 
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of 
Copyright” (2007) Geo Mason L Rev 271 (especially at p 319 et seq), who argues – 
by relying on the 9th Circuit’s decision in Micro Star v Formgen, Inc 154 F 3d 1107 
(1998) – for a doctrine of limited or partial abandonment of copyright for works 
which have been placed in the Creative Commons. 
105 Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2005) 
at para 6-85. 
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would expire”. However, akin to the difficulties in proving an 
abandonment of physical property, the proof of a copyright owner’s 
intention to dedicate his copyright to the public is not so easily 
established.106 Indeed, and unlike the law of trade marks,107 the mere 
non-exploitation by the copyright owner of his exclusive rights will not 
suffice for this purpose.108 The House of Lords recently affirmed this 
proposition in Fisher v Brooker,109 where the claimant – the composer of 
the famous organ solo in the song “A Whiter Shade of Pale” – finally 
achieved the recognition that he deserved notwithstanding the 
extraordinary delay in making his claim for a share of future copyright 
royalties in the musical work (of which the claimant was a joint 
author).110 Apparently, the claimant’s wait for 38 years before asserting 
his copyright in the work did not constitute an abandonment of 
copyright, despite the various equitable defences raised by the defendant 
(including laches, proprietary estoppel and acquiescence) which the 
House, of course, rejected. 
51 To further illustrate the difficulties in ascertaining precisely 
what an outright abandonment of copyright entails, consider the 
following example. Let us assume that the owner of copyright in a 
computer program voluntarily decides to share this piece of software 
with the public without any restrictions upon its use, eg, by making it 
available as “freeware”111 on the Internet (with explicit notification to 
this effect). It may be argued, on one view, that there is in this instance a 
clear intention to “abandon” copyright in the computer program to the 
world at large, coupled with an overt act by which such an intention is 
carried into effect. Does this, however, mean that the copyright owner 
cannot later change his mind and “retrieve” his computer software from 
the Internet, thereby reasserting his copyright in the work?112 
                                                                       
106 British Leyland Motor Corp v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1982] FSR 481 at 492; Plix 
Products Ltd v Frank M Winstone (Merchants) [1986] FSR 63 at 87–88. 
107 Understandably so, since the primary function of trade marks is to serve as 
indicators of source in trade and commerce. 
108 See Weldon v Dicks (1878) 10 Ch D 247 (no abandonment of copyright by the non-
publication of a book for a period of 12 years, during which time the book was 
allowed to remain out of print). 
109 [2009] 1 WLR 1764. 
110 The House of Lords affirmed Blackburne J’s finding at trial that the claimant was a 
joint owner of the musical copyright in the work, with a share of 40%. 
111 But not pursuant to a Creative Commons licence, since different considerations 
may apply – see L P Loren, “Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: 
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of 
Copyright” (2007) Geo Mason L Rev 271. 
112 For a US perspective on the various copyright issues raised by public domain 
software and shareware, see E Samuels, “The Public Domain in Copyright Law” 
(1993) 41 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 137. See also L P Loren, 
“Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative 
Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright” (2007) Geo Mason 
L Rev 271. 
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52 In this author’s view, there is no reason, in principle, why the 
copyright owner cannot subsequently reassert his copyright thus. Of 
course, this is only possible in the prospective sense as against those 
internet users who continue to download and use the software with the 
knowledge – actual or constructive – that copyright has been reclaimed 
by the author. There can, obviously, be no retrospective claim to 
copyright because of the invocation of several possible defences 
(namely, waiver, express/implied licence, as well as the equitable 
doctrines of reliance and estoppel). It is perhaps only in this limited 
sense that the copyright owner can loosely be said to have “abandoned” 
his copyright in the computer program – where abandonment operates 
as a form of “suspension” of rights and the copyright owner is merely 
estopped from enforcing his copyright retrospectively. 
53 Therefore, the alternative view in such an instance is that the 
owner of copyright in the computer software did not quite “abandon” 
his copyright (as the word is traditionally understood in the legal sense) 
when he made the software available to the public on the Internet as 
“freeware”. Rather, in retaining copyright all along, the copyright owner 
had merely granted an open and unencumbered licence to all Netizens 
to access and use his computer software at no cost and without the need 
to seek permission. As such, the copyright owner can always, subject to 
arguments of reliance and estoppel in equity, revoke this licence at a 
later time (with explicit and adequate notice) and subsequently reassert 
his copyright, prospectively. 
54 Finally, let us consider the intriguing observation made by 
Whitford J at first instance in the well-known decision of Catnic 
Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd,113 in which the defendant (in two 
design drawings of lintels) was alleged to have infringed the plaintiff ’s 
copyright in the drawings of lintels in their brochures (which drawings 
subsequently formed the subject of their product patent). The learned 
judge posed the question thus: what “is the effect, if any, of the 
publication of the patent drawings on the enforceability by the plaintiffs 
of their independent copyright in substantially identical drawings”?114 It 
is incontrovertible that by applying for and procuring the publication of 
a patent, a patentee is deemed to have dedicated his invention to the 
public, subject only to his 20-year monopoly under the patent if it is 
confirmed. And after the expiration of the patent monopoly, public 
policy arguably dictates that any independent copyright subsisting in 
drawings that were reproduced in the patent specification ought to cease 
and be likewise dedicated to the public, or, in the words of Whitford J, 
“there must on the expiry of the patent be an implied licence by the 
                                                                       
113 [1978] FSR 405. 
114 [1978] FSR 405 at 427. 
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patentee covering any use made of the patent drawing”.115 What remains 
unclear, though, is whether the artistic copyright in these separate and 
independent drawings should continue to subsist alongside the patent 
whilst the patent is still in force. Interestingly, Whitford J expressed the 
view that once the patent specification is published, a patentee is 
deemed to have abandoned his copyright in drawings which are the 
equivalent of the patent drawings.116 
55 With respect, the present author does not share this view. The 
patentee ought to retain his independent copyright to these drawings 
(ie, no abandonment) despite the grant of the patent – he should not be 
put to an election between two concurrent and legitimate rights.117 In 
the event of an infringement, the patentee’s preference is, of course, to 
bring suit under the patent (which confers stronger monopoly rights) 
rather than to rely upon coterminous copyright protection (which, inter 
alia, requires proof of copying). It may also not be worthwhile for the 
patentee to pursue his claim in copyright (against three-dimensional 
copies of the two-dimensional artistic works which have been 
reproduced in the patent specification)118 since the defendant may 
arguably raise the defence of public interest provided for in s 171(3) of 
the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.119 However, 
notwithstanding the veracity of these arguments, the patentee cannot 
and should not be deemed to have abandoned his copyright in the 
drawings upon the publication of the patent specification because of the 
distinct possibility that the patent, even if it were to be granted, may still 
be subsequently invalidated (eg, for want of novelty or inventive step).120 
If this were to happen, the patentee’s only recourse would be to fall back 
on his co-existent copyright protection in these separate and 
independent drawings, or be otherwise left without any remedy against 
the alleged infringer. Surely, the nullity of the patent coupled with the 
                                                                       
115 [1978] FSR 405 at 427. See also the recommendation of the 1977 Copyright 
Committee, Cmnd 6732 at para 915, as well as the decision of Walsh J in  
the Canadian Federal Court in Rucker Co v Gavel’s Vulcanizing Ltd (1985)  
7 CPR (3d) 294 at 312. 
116 [1978] FSR 405 at 427–428. 
117 See, eg, Werner Motors Ltd v AW Gamage Ltd (1904) 21 RPC 621. 
118 There is no infringement of artistic copyright in these two-dimensional drawings 
where a published patent specification is reproduced in two dimensions – see the 
Singapore Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed) s 108(6). 
119 It may be argued, on grounds of public interest, that “… a patentee necessarily 
makes an election accepting that, in return for a potential monopoly, upon 
publication, the material disclosed by him in the specification must be deemed to 
be open to be used by the public …” (Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd 
[1978] FSR 405 at 427, per Whitford J). Although the Singapore Copyright Act 
1987 does not contain an identical provision, it is submitted that the generic fair 
dealing defences in the statute are sufficiently broad to encompass considerations 
of public interest. 
120 See, eg, Singapore Patents Act (Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed) ss 80 and 82. 
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deprivation of any form of copyright protection would be too costly a 
price for the inventor to pay.121 In any event, it was pointed out in 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright that Whitford J’s views, which 
have not been subsequently endorsed in the courts of England and 
indeed elsewhere, were “obiter to the actual decision in the case, and the 
Court of Appeal, whilst upholding the learned judge’s finding of non-
infringement, declined to comment on the question of abandonment”.122 
The better view, therefore, is that it is not at all appropriate to infer an 
intention on the part of the patentee to abandon copyright just by the 
mere application for a patent or publication of the patent specification. 
VI. Conclusion 
56 It has been argued in this article that there is no good reason 
why the common law should not independently recognise the doctrine 
of (unilateral) “divesting abandonment”. However, given that it is 
difficult to predict with any certainty how much proof is required to 
establish a specific and unequivocal intention on the part of the original 
owner to abandon the property in question, it is envisaged that the 
courts (especially in the UK) will be slow to make any finding of 
abandonment except in the clearest of cases. 
57 In the context of trash bags which have been left by the curbside 
or at a common rubbish dump for collection, the better view is that 
notwithstanding the absence of physical control or actual possession, 
there is still no definite intention on the part of the owner to abandon 
all rights of ownership in the rubbish (res derelictae) to the world at 
large; property in trash remains with the original owner who can always 
reclaim possession. Instead, the deposit of trash bags in such a manner 
                                                                       
121 Unless, of course, the copyright statute has expressly provided thus – for example, 
as was the case in Singapore in respect of industrially applied designs (which are 
also two-dimensional artistic works) of a functional nature: see Copyright Act  
(Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed) s 70. This view is also shared by the learned authors in 
S Ricketson & C Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Designs and 
Confidential Information (Sydney: Law Book Company, looseleaf) at para 14.450: 
“[T]he most appropriate solution is by way of legislative amendment rather than 
by seeking to stretch and distort existing legal doctrines to achieve this result.” See, 
further, ss 73 and 74 of the Copyright Act which were enacted to prevent or reduce 
the overlap between the protection conferred by copyright and registered designs. 
122 See Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 
2005) at para 6-85. Indeed, Buckley LJ in the Court of Appeal called this an 
“interesting question” but did not wish to express any concluded view on the 
matter (see [1979] FSR 619 at 628). See, further, House of Spring Gardens Ltd v 
Point Blank Ltd [1983] FSR 213 at 269–270 (High Court of Ireland); Ogden 
Industries Pty Ltd v Kis (Australia) Ltd [1983] FSR 619 at 634–636 (Supreme Court 
of New South Wales); Wham-O Manufacturing Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1982] 
RPC 281 at 297–299 (High Court of New Zealand); Interlego AG v Tyco Industries 
Inc [1987] FSR 409 at 455–457 (Court of Appeal of Hong Kong). 
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and in an environment that is accessible to the public represents the 
only practical means to facilitate refuse collection and disposal, and also 
signifies the garbage generator’s intention to transfer property in the 
rubbish – much like delivering a “gift” – directly to the trash collector at 
that time (traditio incertae personae). It is therefore submitted that there 
is no abandonment of trash under such circumstances and a third party 
dumpster diver may well be faced with an action for conversion or a 
charge of theft. May it also be mentioned in passing that the act of 
dumpster diving involves, particularly in cases of competitive intelligence 
gathering and industrial espionage, serious ethical considerations, such 
that it may be preferable to discourage such behaviour in the first 
instance as a matter of public policy.123 
58 Insofar as the abandonment of IP rights is concerned, it appears 
that the courts are generally reluctant, again except in the clearest of 
cases, to arrive at the conclusion that the proprietor has unequivocally 
abandoned his ownership rights in IP, particularly where copyright is at 
issue. The legal position in this regard is therefore not dissimilar to that 
concerning the abandonment of property rights in tangibles. In the 
recent decision of the House of Lords in Fisher v Brooker,124 Lord Hope 
underscored the sanctity of property rights in these terms:125 
[I]t would be a very strong thing, in the absence of a proprietary 
estoppel, to deny [a claimant] the opportunity of exercising his right 
of property in his own share of the copyright. The law of property is 
concerned with rights in things. The distinction which exists between 
the exercise of rights and the obtaining of discretionary remedies is of 
fundamental importance in any legal system. There is no concept in our 
law that is more absolute than a right of property. Where it exists, it is 
for the owner to exercise it as he pleases. He does not need the 
permission of the court, nor is it subject to the exercise of the court’s 
discretion. The benefits that flow from intellectual property are the 
product of this concept. They provide an incentive to innovation and 
creativity. A person who has a good idea, as Mr Fisher [the claimant] 
did when he composed the well-known organ solo that did so much to 
make the song in its final form such a success, is entitled to protect the 
advantage that he has gained from this and to earn his reward. These 
are rights which the court must respect and which it will enforce if it is 
asked to do so [even if the claimant had waited for such a long time to 
assert his legal right of property]. [emphasis added] 
                                                                       
123 See Tennant Co v Advance Machine Co Inc 355 NW 2d 720 (1984); H Wingo, 
“Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law” (1997) 16 Yale 
Law and Policy Review 195; A Crane, “In the company of spies: When competitive 
intelligence gathering becomes industrial espionage” (2005) 48 Business 
Horizons 233. 
124 [2009] 1 WLR 1764. 
125 [2009] 1 WLR 1764 at 1768. 
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59 A very timely reminder indeed. By way of a postscript, it may be 
apposite to ask whether the private investigators hired by the defendant 
in Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa,126 notwithstanding the issue 
of abandonment, had themselves committed a trespass (both a civil 
wrong as well as a criminal offence) in surreptitiously entering the 
common rubbish dump – which is arguably the “private” property of 
the building’s landlord – and retrieving the plaintiff ’s trash bags. This 
question was not raised before the Singapore courts and may well attract 
attention and further inquiry on another occasion. 
 
                                                                       
126 Vestwin Trading Pte Ltd v Obegi Melissa [2006] 3 SLR(R) 573. 
